Have Your Say: SCA Judgment & Naledi LM

Thank you to community member Jerome Morrison for stepping forward to engage with us. Now we want to hear from you: What does the Supreme Court of Appeal ruling mean for Naledi—service delivery, finances, and accountability? Do you agree with the outcome, and do you feel you understand the judgment?

Drop your views in the comments (plain language welcome), or send us a DM if you prefer privacy. Keep it respectful, stick to facts, and tell us what you think should happen next.

Your voice shapes our coverage. #CommunityTalk #DistrictNewsThatMatter

The municipal council held a special meeting to address the order of the Supreme

Court of appeal. In attendance was the mayor and speaker, both of whom are part

of the court’s order. Was it appropriate for these two to continue in this sitting or

should they not have recused themselves and especially the Mayor, is highlighted

by the judgement as ignoring advice and the interest of the public purse.

The Plascon-Evans principle from the original case might be worth referencing again to show

consistency in legal standards.

Based on a strict interpretation of the principles laid out in the Supreme Court of

Appeal (SCA) judgment, it was highly inappropriate and potentially unlawful for the

Mayor and the Speaker to participate in that special council meeting.

Here is a detailed analysis of why their participation is problematic, referencing the

logic of the judgment you provided.

1. The SCA Judgment Directly Impeached Their Integrity and Judgment

The SCA did not just rule against the Municipality as an abstract entity; it specifically

targeted the conduct of the individual officials, including the Mayor and the Speaker.

Personal Cost Order: The most powerful indicator is the personal costs order. The

court found their conduct so “reprehensible” and such a “flagrant abuse of office”

that they were ordered to pay costs from their own pockets. This is a rare and

severe judicial sanction.

Findings on the Mayor: The judgment was scathing in its assessment of the Mayor’s

actions. 

It found he:

Ignored legitimate concerns about nepotism and a conflict of interest. Failed to recuse himself from the recruitment panel when legally required to do so. His conduct “tarnished the entire recruitment process.”

Findings on Officials: The court found that the third to fifth appellants (including

the Mayor and Speaker) were “clinging to the benefit of the fees paid by the

Municipality” and “clearly being drained by ongoing litigation.”By participating in the meeting to decide how to respond to this very judgment, they are essentially being asked to make decisions about a situation for which they have been personally and severely sanctioned. This is a fundamental conflict of interest. The Principle of Nemo Iudex In Causa Sua (No One Should Be a

Judge in Their Own Cause) This is a cornerstone of natural justice. The Mayor and Speaker have a direct, personal interest in the outcome of the meeting. The council’s discussion would inherently involve:

Assessing the conduct that led to the judgment.

Deciding on potential consequences or accountability for the failed appointment

and wasted costs.

Planning a new process that they, based on the court’s findings, cannot be trusted to run fairly.

They cannot possibly be impartial arbiters or participants in a process that is, in part, about their own misconduct. Their presence inherently prejudices the proceedings and denies the council the objective deliberation it needs.

2. The Specific Conflict of Interest and Duty to Recuse

The SCA heavily relied on Regulation 12 to invalidate the original appointment because

the Mayor failed to recuse himself from a process where he had a conflict.

The same logic applies here, even more strongly:

Then: The conflict was a perceived “indebtedness” to Mr. Segapo for past favours (nepotistic appointments).

Now: The conflict is direct and personal. They are parties to the court order. They have a direct financial and reputational interest in how the council responds. Any decision to comply with the court order is a decision that validates the court’s criticism of them personally. If a perceived conflict warranted recusal then, a direct and material conflict warrants

recusal now.

3. The Question of Leadership and Public Trust

Beyond the strict legal and ethical principles, this is a profound failure of leadership. Contempt for the Court’s Findings: Their participation demonstrates a continuation of the very attitude the SCA condemned: a disregard for legality, a sense of entitlement, and a willingness to place their own interests above those of the public and the institution.

Squandering Public Trust: The public and the council members cannot have confidence that a meeting about implementing a court order, aimed at correcting their malfeasance, will be conducted fairly with them in the room. It creates the appearance that they are trying to control the narrative and mitigate their own accountability.

Conclusion

No, it was not appropriate for the Mayor and the Speaker to participate in the special

meeting including councilors who are party to the case .The principled, lawful, and ethically correct course of action would have been for both to:

1. Formally recuse themselves from all council discussions and decisions relating to the implementation of the SCA judgment.

2. Allow the council, led by members not implicated in the personal costs order, to deliberate freely on how to comply with the court’s directive to initiate a new, fair recruitment process.

Their failure to do so suggests that the culture of impunity and disregard for the principles of legality, which the SCA went to great lengths to condemn, persists within the municipality’s leadership.

Disclaimer: This is an analysis based on the legal and ethical principles evident in the

judgment . It does not constitute formal legal advice.

** Maybe the best option will be to ask the province to bring and administrator to act as MM

-This Opinion piece holds the views of the author, Mr. Morrison.